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The Balancing Act: Will EPA Be Allowed to Research a Compromise 
Between Pro-Business and Pro-Environment? 
 







In Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed the scope of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
grandfathering authority under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). The case is 
significant because of the precedential value of the court’s interpretation of 
EPA’s grandfathering authority. However, this precedential importance does 
not come as much from the court’s holding as it does from the Ninth Circuit’s 
inappropriate balancing of pro-business and pro-environment considerations 
in reviewing the EPA’s actions under these particular circumstances. 
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case, the EPA should have 
broad discretion in choosing when and how to grandfather in provisions 
under the CAA. The agency should be able to work with major-emitting 
facilities in finding the most cost-effective and mutually beneficial methods 
of achieving the nation’s environmental goals.  
 
This note begins by setting forth the facts and events leading to the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision to limit the EPA’s grandfathering authority. The 
second section examines the legal precedent and historic use of 
grandfathering authority by federal agencies. The third section provides the 
court’s legal analysis, followed by a final section that discusses the policy 
implications of this decision. Ultimately, the conclusion drawn is that despite 
the correct holding, Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A. improperly interpreted 
Congress’s intent on the EPA’s grandfathering authority under the CAA, 
disregarding the agency’s inherent authority to implement and enforce the 
nation’s environmental regulations.  
                                                
1 762 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 




II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
 
On February 15, 2008, Avenal Power Center applied for a Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) Permit to build and operate a 600-
megawatt, natural gas-fired power plant in Avenal, California.2 The EPA 
failed to grant or deny the application within one year, as required by the 
CAA.3 While Avenal Power’s application was under consideration, the EPA 
tightened its air quality standards.4 As a result, Avenal Power filed suit on 
March 9, 2010 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
seeking to compel the EPA to issue the permit under the standards that would 
have applied had the EPA acted within the required time frame.5  
 
The District Court granted Avenal Power’s motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, and ordered the EPA to make a decision on the permit 
application.6 Although the EPA initially said it had to apply the standards 
applicable at the time the permit was issued, it later changed its ruling and 
granted Avenal Power’s permit under the air quality standards in effect at the 
time the application was submitted.7 Initially, the EPA argued that the CAA 
“prohibits the agency from granting the permit unless Avenal Power 
complies with the [more stringent] superseding standards.”8 After conducting 
a policy review, the EPA reversed its decision and issued Avenal Power’s 
permit exempt from the new, tighter air quality standards, citing that “it 
possessed inherent grandfathering authority even absent express 
authorization under the CAA or related regulations.”9  
 
The Sierra Club, Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice, 
Center for Biological Diversity, and El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio 
                                                
2 Id. at 973. 
3 Id.  
4 “EPA tightened NAAQS for NO2, capping hourly emissions at 100 parts per billion, 
with the new regulations to take effect on April 12, 2010.” Id. at 974.  
5 Id. at 975.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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(collectively referred to as “Petitioners”)10 submitted comments to the EPA 
objecting to the EPA’s issuance of the permit and declaration of 
grandfathering authority.11 Petitioners were concerned that this project would 
“adversely impact the environment and health and quality of life of local 
residents.”12 After the Environmental Appeals Board declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over the review of the EPA’s grandfathering actions, Petitioners 
filed two petitions for judicial review with the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the EPA’s interpretation of its statutory 
authority under the CAA.13 Avenal Power successfully intervened and the 
two petitions were consolidated for review.14  
 
The Court of Appeals granted the petition for review, vacated the 
decision to issue the permit, and remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.15 Specifically, the Court held that the CAA 
requires the EPA enforce the regulations in effect at the time each permit is 
issued, so the EPA’s exercise of grandfathering authority in this case was not 
appropriate.16 
 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Enacted in 1970, the purpose of the CAA is to protect and enhance 
the quality of the country’s air resources and to promote the public health, 
welfare, and productive capacity of its population.17 Accordingly, major-
emitting facilities regulated by the CAA are “subject to the best available 
control technology for each pollutant” emitted from a facility.18 Permit 
                                                
10 Id. at 973. 
11 Id. at 974. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 976.  
14 The United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 246, International 
Brotherhood of Electric Workers Local 100, and Insulators Local 16 successfully filed a 
brief as amici curiae. Id.   
15 Id. at 984.  
16 Id. at 983.  
17 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012). 
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applications under the CAA are to be granted or denied within one year of the 
date the application was filed by a facility.19 
 
According to Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., when reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute, if Congress has 
spoken directly to the precise issue and its intent is clear, the matter is 
considered resolved.20 However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the issue, the court must determine an acceptable construction of 
the statute.21 In that case, the Supreme Court applied the Chevron two-part 
test to EPA’s Emissions Offset Interpretive Ruling, which stated that 
construction of new major-emitting facilities has to meet “the lowest 
achievable emission rate” under the current standards for that type of 
facility.22 The Court pointed out that the tension permeating such issues of 
agency authority is the legislative struggle “between interests seeking strict 
schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests 
advancing the economic concern that strict schemes would retard industrial 
development with attendant social costs.”23  
 
Although not directly related to the CAA, Brock v. Pierce County 
considered the scope of an agency’s statutory flexibility in the granting of 
regulatory permits.24 At issue in Brock was a provision of the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (“CETA”), which required the Secretary of 
Labor to investigate and make a determination as to whether a grant recipient 
was misusing CETA funds within 120 days after it received a complaint.25 
The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the Secretary of Labor loses its 
power to recover misused CETA funds after the required 120-day period has 
expired.26 In that case, Respondent, who had received two grants, was 
ordered to repay the costs arising out of employees hired who were not 
eligible to participate in the CETA program.27 Respondent argued that the 
                                                
19 42 U.S.C. § 7475(c) (2012). 
20 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
21 Id. at 843. 
22 Id. at 848. See also 41 Fed. Reg. 55525 (Dec. 21, 1976). 
23 Id. at 847. 
24 Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253 (1986). 
25 Id. at 254-55. 
26 Id. at 255. 
27 Id. at 256-57.  
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Secretary of Labor could not issue such an order because the final 
determination had been made considerably more than 120 days after the 
submission of the audit report, thereby prejudicing Respondent.28 Looking at 
CETA’s history and purpose, the Court reasoned that when there are 
important public rights in question, and less drastic remedies are available for 
failure to meet a statutory deadline, a court should not assume that Congress 
intended for the agency to lose its power to act.29 The Court thus held that the 
provision in question, standing alone, did not divest the Secretary of Labor of 
jurisdiction to act if the 120 days expired.30 
 
The EPA first asserted its grandfathering authority in the context of 
the CAA after the agency passed the 1977 Amendments to the Act. Soon 
after, a lawsuit was filed to challenge an inconsistency between provisions 
where a later section of the Act had the effect of allowing permits to be 
issued for the construction of projects for which permits would otherwise 
have been barred by an earlier provision of the Act.31 To resolve the 
inconsistency, the EPA chose to delay making the earlier provision valid and 
grandfathered certain projects from its requirements. In examining the 
validity of the EPA’s actions, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia reasoned that the Act’s purpose to protect the quality of 
the nation’s air should be balanced against economic loss or delay that may 
result from increased environmental standards.32 The Court held that the EPA 
has the authority to “fashion, via rulemaking,” a compromise between the 
inconsistent provisions.33  
 
Later that same year, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia specified in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle that 
grandfathering provisions in the CAA were only intended to grandfather 
existing industries, not to “constitute a perpetual immunity from all 
standards.”34 At issue in that case was the extent of the EPA’s exemption 
                                                
28 Id. at 257. 
29 Id. at 260.  
30 Id. at 266. 
31 Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty.v. E.P.A., 600 F.2d 844, 853-54 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
32 Id. at 869. 
33 Id. at 874. 
34 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  
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authority.35 The Court held that although the EPA may make exemptions in 
“de minimis situations,” the agency bears the burden of showing that the 
matters at issue are trivial or of administrative necessity.36 It was noted, 
however, that this narrow exemption for modifications does not provide a 
basis for the “EPA to exercise ‘revisory power’ to exclude new sources as 
well as modifications.”37 
 
In 2003, as older grandfathered power plants came under the new 
environmental compliance standards, the fair notice doctrine was introduced 
into CAA legislation.38 The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
declined to accept one power plant’s argument that it did not have fair notice 
of its obligations under the CAA, as amended.39 The court stated that “notice 
that matters for the fair notice doctrine are the statements the defendant 
receives before the alleged violation begins.”40 Thus, the plant’s argument 
that it was deprived notice of the EPA’s interpretation of routine maintenance 
did not hold merit.41 In the end, the Court left it up to the EPA to make a 
case-by-case determination of whether a project at a power plant rose to the 
point of modification, therefore triggering CAA compliance, “by weighing 
                                                
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 360. 
37 Id. at 361.  
38 United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2003). 
39 Id. at 1024. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. The power plant’s notice primarily consisted of the Clay Memo and Wis. Elec. 
Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990), which discussed the routine 
maintenance provision and “made it ‘ascertainably certain’ that the EPA would make a 
case-by-case determination by weighing the nature, extent, purpose, frequency, cost, and 
other relevant factors, to make a common-sense finding.” Id. The Clay Memo expressed 
EPA’s stance on NSR determination and was intended to make a clear public statement to 
the regulated community on how EPA interpreted the CAA and accompanying 
regulations like the routine regulations like the routine maintenance exemption. Id. at 
1018. The court also pointed out that reading the regulation in context gives notice to 
companies that the routine maintenance exemption is not be construed broadly. Id. at 
1015. In addition, a 1989 letter by the Utility Air Regulatory Group (“UARG”), 
representing numerous members of the utility industry, confirmed that the regulated 
community understood how EPA interpreted routine maintenance in the Clay Memo. Id. 
at 1019. Finally, there were two public statements made by the Assistant EPA 
Administrator in 1991, and a 1992 statement in a Federal Register Preamble, which 
discussed the scope of the routine maintenance exemption. Id. at 1020. 
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the nature, extent, purpose, frequency, cost and other relevant factors to make 
a common-sense finding.”42 The District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio agreed, holding that only de minimis activities serve to trigger the 
routine maintenance exemption, and any other changes at a power plant 
trigger the most updated CAA regulations.43 
 
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
echoed a similar conclusion, pointing out that although Congress initially 
grandfathered in some provisions of the CAA for existing power plants, the 
intent was that once those power plants were retired, new power plants would 
be built and maintained subject to current, more rigorous pollution controls.44 
  
In 2011, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania considered a case where modifications undertaken at 
grandfathered units of a coal-fired plant allegedly should have triggered more 
rigorous CAA emissions standards.45 In that case, although the court 
sympathized with the plaintiffs’ frustrations that society carried the brunt of 
the significant SO2 emissions from the grandfathered facility,46 the Court 
chose to adhere to the plain text of the CAA, which stated that no major-
emitting facility may be constructed unless each of the statutory conditions 
are met.47 Specifically, the court pointed out that although the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program was initially aimed at the 
construction of new facilities, the 1977 amendments applied the PSD 
requirements to modifications of grandfathered plants, like the one at issue 
here, which would result in significant net emissions increases.48  
 
Currently, EPA’s grandfathering authority is formalized in § 760149 
of the CAA and in the Administrative Procedure Act.50 These sections outline 
                                                
42 Id.  
43 United States v. Ohio Edison Co., F. Supp. 2d 829, 888 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
44 United States v. Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2006). 
45 United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 823 F.Supp.2d 274, 280 (W.D. Pa. 
2011). 
46 Id. at 297.  
47 Id. at 281. 
48 Id. at 280. 
49 “The Administrator is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry 
out his functions under this chapter. The Administrator may delegate to any officer or 
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formal notice and comment rulemaking procedures to which the EPA must 
adhere when invoking any exemptions or amending regulations on a case-by-
case basis. Last year, for example, the EPA used its grandfathering authority 
in the implementation of new standards for a particulate matter, but only after 
publishing a public notice of a draft permit which explicitly built in new 
regulations for pending permit applications by an operative date.51 
 
For years, agencies and courts have struggled to balance the 
preservation of the nation’s air standards and the social and economic 
progressivity of businesses. Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A. once again attempts to 
find the perfect balance. 
 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
 
In Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit ruled against the EPA, concluding that the EPA must apply 
air emissions standards in effect at the time it issues a permitting decision, 
rather than the standards in effect at the time the permit application was 
filed.52 A circuit judge wrote for a three-judge panel addressing two issues: 
(1) whether Petitioners had standing to seek review,53 and (2) whether the 
EPA exceeded its authority under the CAA by grandfathering emissions 
standards in a Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit issued to 
Avenal Power.54 
 
The Court found that Petitioners, as associations, had standing to 
bring the suit on behalf of their members, provided their members would 
have standing to bring the suit in their own right.55 To analyze whether the 
                                                                                                                     
employee of the Environmental Protection Agency such of his powers and duties under 
this chapter, except the making of regulations subject to section 7607(d) of this title, as he 
may deem necessary or expedient.” 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2012).  
50 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
51 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed.Reg. 3,086, 
3,249 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
52 762 F.3d 971, 983 (9th Cir. 2014). 
53 Id. at 977. 
54 Id. at 979.  
55 Id. at 977.  In addition, the interest at stake must be germane to the association’s 
purpose and the participation of individual members in the lawsuit must not be required.  
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Petitioners’ individual members had standing, the Court looked at whether 
the members suffered an injury-in-fact, whether the alleged wrongful conduct 
caused the injury, and whether the injury could be redressed by a favorable 
decision.56 Applying these criteria, the Court concluded that Petitioners’ 
individual members would have standing to bring the suit in their own right. 
As such, the Court was satisfied that the majority of Petitioners had Article 
III standing and  proceeded to decide the case on the merits.57 
 
On the second issue, the Court reviewed the EPA’s interpretation of 
the CAA, which, in part, requires the EPA to enforce current air emission 
standards and to act on permit applications within one year.58 The Court 
began its inquiry by looking at the statute’s plain and unambiguous 
meaning.59 The Court concluded that the CAA clearly requires the EPA to 
apply the standards in effect at the time of the permitting decision because 
the role of the EPA is to make sure that permit applicants comply with all 
current air quality control regulations.60 In fact, in its initial memorandum, 
the EPA wrote that it “has previously concluded that the relevant provisions 
cover any NAAQS that is in effect at the time of issuance of any permit.”61 
This is supported by Supreme Court case law.62 Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit cited Ziffrin Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943), which 
stated that administrative agencies must mimic the appellate process, so that 
orders are not issued contrary to existing legislation.63 
  
According to the CAA, a delay in granting a permit application 
provides a private cause of action to compel timely action.64 Delaying the 
permitting decision does not impede the EPA from enforcing its current 
                                                                                                                     
Id.  Avenal Power conceded these two points.  Id. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 978. As long as one Plaintiff has Article III standing, the Court does not need to 
determine whether the other Plaintiffs have Article III standing. Id.  
58 Id. at 978-79. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 979.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 980. 
64 Id. 
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emissions standards.65 Therefore, the EPA’s claim that it could not determine 
from the statute which standards to apply because it missed the application’s 
one-year deadline fails, because the EPA could work with the applicant to 
ensure the applicant is in compliance with outstanding regulations.66 In fact, 
Avenal Power did work with the EPA for years to make sure the power plant 
was in compliance, but when those efforts failed, the EPA chose to waive the 
newly effective regulations on an ad hoc basis.67  
 
However, the court found that the EPA’s traditional exercise of 
grandfathering authority did not align with the agency’s actions in this case 
because it did not follow its former procedures.68 On prior occasions, the 
EPA identified an operative date, followed formal notice and comment 
rulemaking procedures, and then grandfathered in pending permit 
applications with built-in new regulations.69 In contrast, the court found that 
in this case, the EPA did not set any precedential value, but instead acted as a 
matter of convenience, inappropriately claiming authority to waive the law’s 
requirements at will.70 Overstepping the bounds of the agency’s statutory 
authority71 violated the CAA, which requires the EPA to enforce regulations 




What started out as a technicality tested the limits of the EPA’s 
statutory authority and flexibility in implementing air quality control 
regulations under the CAA. In this case, the Ninth Circuit came to the 
politically defensible conclusion that major-emitting facilities must adhere to 
                                                
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 981.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 983. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-32, 94 S. Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974) 
(holding that “[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally 
created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the 
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress[,]” but noting 
that “[n]o matter ho rational or consistent with congressional intent a particular decision 
might be, [such decision] cannot be made on an ad hoc basis…”). 
72 Id. 
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current air emissions standards as determined at the issuance of an EPA 
permit. However, this decision left the EPA’s grandfathering authority in the 
same place – a restrictive formal procedure – and pushed the EPA back into 
its statutory box of almost impractical goals and formal procedures. Although 
on its face the court reasoned correctly, the Ninth Circuit missed an 
opportunity to validate the authority the EPA must inherently have in order to 
fulfill its duties in implementing and enforcing environmental laws.  
 
Any time the EPA is involved, two competing interests battle for 
balance: pro-business versus pro-environment. Bold accusations are often 
made about the EPA’s involvement in the industries it regulates. For 
example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce describes the EPA’s actions as “a 
series of one-sided, politically-charged regulations that are intended to take 
the place of legislation that cannot achieve a consensus in Congress.”73 The 
alleged political overreach stems from the amplified financial burden placed 
on private companies that see their costs rise due to stringent industry 
regulation.  
 
In this case, Avenal Power was not able to meet the EPA’s air 
emissions requirements because of administrative mistakes on the EPA’s 
part. The two parties tried to work the problem out, but when they were 
unsuccessful, the EPA made an exception for Avenal Power by 
grandfathering in provisions that were applicable at the time the permit 
application was submitted in 2008. Pro-business interest and saving face for 
the EPA won out.  
 
As a result, environmental supporters alleged that allowing less 
stringent regulations would increase air pollution from the Avenal Energy 
Project and cause or exacerbate health problems of people living nearby.74  
The Ninth Circuit found that these were cognizable injuries in fact and gave 
petitioners standing to bring this lawsuit.75 As in U.S. v. EME Homer City 
                                                
73 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Regulatory Areas, Energy & Environment, 
http://www.uschamber.com/regulations/areas (Last visited October 7th, 2015). 
74 762 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2014). 
75 Id.  
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Generation L.P. in 2011, the court disregarded the impact on business in 
favor of promoting political interests of preserving the environment.76 
 
The Ninth Circuit correctly applied the Chevron test77 and all legal 
precedents, but this case highlights a weakness in the first prong of the 
Chevron test (i.e., whether Congressional intent on the precise issue is clear) 
when applied to the CAA. When the CAA’s purpose is to “protect and 
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources as to promote the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population,”78 pro-
business arguments are essentially destined to lose. On top of that, the Obama 
administration has made environmental issues a political and social priority, 
with the following pro-environment considerations: “That bright blue ball 
rising over the moon’s surface, containing everything we hold dear – the 
laughter of children, a quiet sunrise, all the hopes and dreams of posterity – 
that’s what’s at stake. That’s what we’re fighting for. And if we remember 
that, I’m absolutely sure we’ll succeed.”79  
 
The EPA is mandated to set emissions limits based upon what a 
facility can achieve using adequately demonstrated technology.80 Certain 
CAA provisions, like the PSD program, are aimed at a group of facilities81 
which, due to their size, are considered to be primarily “responsible for 
emission of the deleterious pollutants that befoul our nation’s air,” and are 
financially able to bear the substantial regulatory costs imposed upon them.82 
However, the environmental priorities continue to hold far greater weight 
than cost feasibility, primarily due to Congressional intent and CAA’s 
                                                
76 Citizens to Save Spencer Cty. v. E.P.A., 600 F.2d 844, 853-54 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
77 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
78 Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 762 F.3d 971, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2014). 
79 President Barack Obama, June 25, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy. 
80 Nat. Resources Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
81 See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (An emitting 
facility is “major” if it either “(1) actually emits the specified annual tonnage of any air 
pollutant, or (2) has the potential, when operating at full design capacity, to emit the 
statutory amount…. When determining a facility’s potential to emit air pollutants, EPA 
must look to the facility’s ‘design capacity’ a concept which not only includes a facility’s 
productive capacity (a criterion employed by EPA) but also takes into account the 
anticipated functioning of the air pollution control equipment designed into the facility”).  
82 Id.  
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legislative history. The Senate Report for the 1970 amendment made it clear 
that the EPA must develop air quality standards independently of technical 
feasibility or cost concerns:83  
 
In the Committee discussions, considerable concern was 
expressed regarding the use of the concept of technical 
feasibility as the basis of ambient air standards. The 
Committee determined that 1) the health of people is more 
important than the question of whether the early achievement 
of ambient air quality standards protective of health is 
technically feasible; and, 2) the growth of pollution load in 
many areas, even with application of available technology, 
would still be deleterious to public health ... Therefore, the 
Committee determined that existing sources of pollutants 
either should meet the standard of the law or be closed 
down.84   
 
Relying on these statements, in Union Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., the 
Supreme Court held that the 1970 CAA amendments were “expressly 
designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that 
might at the time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible.”85  
 
Fortunately, courts have softened their reliance on the above Senate 
statements. Most recently, in Energy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that the EPA permissibly relied on a cost-benefit analysis in 
promulgating regulations under the Clean Water Act.86 Specifically, the 
Court’s analysis focused on how the judicial branch should apply the 
Chevron test when a statute is silent on whether the agency should make a 
cost-benefit analysis in issuing regulations and site-specific variances from 
                                                
83 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) (holding that, 
especially in complex cases, “EPA may not consider implementation costs in setting 
primary and secondary NAAQS under § 109(b) of the CAA”). 
84 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, pp. 2-3 (1970). 
85 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). 
86 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009). Petitioners requested review 
of an EPA final rule under the Clean Water Act regulating cooling-water intake structures 
at existing power plants.  
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national performance standards.87 In the end, the court concluded that the 
“EPA’s current practice is a reasonable and hence legitimate exercise of its 
discretion to weigh benefits against costs that the agency has been proceeding 
in essentially this fashion for over 30 years.”88 Nonetheless, with such strong 
statements preserved in the CAA’s legislative history, environmental goals 
continue to take priority over economic feasibility.  
 
The pecuniary impact of environmental upgrades on power plants is 
quite significant. According to the EPA, the Obama administration’s most 
recent goal to reduce carbon emissions by 30 percent before 2030 is 
estimated to cost businesses between $4 and $9 billion per year in 
compliance alone.89 This means that regulation of carbon dioxide emissions 
alone will cost the American economy $50 billion per year between now and 
2030.90 The cost of compliance hurts more than a company’s bottom line. 
                                                
87 Id. at 223 (“The regulations permit the issuance of site-specific variances from the 
national performance standards if a facility can demonstrate either that the costs of 
compliance are ‘significantly greater than’ the costs considered by the agency in setting 
the standards, 40 CFR § 125.94(a)(5)(i) (2012), or that the costs of compliance ‘would be 
significantly greater than the benefits of complying with the applicable performance 
standards,’ § 125.94(a)(50(ii).”). Id. at 215. 
88 Id. at 224. See In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 1 E.A.D. 332, 340 (1977) 
(holding that although 33. U.S.C.A § 1326(b), which instructs EPA to set standards for 
cooling water intake structures that reflect “the best technology available for minimizing 
adverse environmental impact,” does not require cost-benefit analysis, it is not reasonable 
to “interpret § 1326(b) as requiring use of technology whose cost is wholly 
disproportionate to the environmental benefit to be gained). See also In re Central 
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., EPA Opinions, General Counsel, NPDES Permits, No. 
63, pp. 371, 381 (July 29, 1977) (“EPA ultimately must demonstrate that the present 
value of the cumulative annual cost of modifications to cooling water intake structures is 
not wholly out of proportion to the magnitude of the estimated environmental gains); 
Seacost Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 311 (C.A.1 197) (rejecting 
challenge to an EPA permit decision that was based in part on EPA’s determination that 
further restrictions would be “wholly disproportionate to any environmental benefit).  
89 John Miller, New EPA Carbon Regulation: What will the Impacts be on Consumer 
Power Costs?, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (July 14, 2014), 
http://theenergycollective.com/jemillerep/409346/new-epa-carbon-regulation-impacts-
existing-states-market-based-greenhouse-gas-prog.  
90 Energy Institute Report Finds That Potential New EPA Carbon Regulations Will 
Damage U.S. Economy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press Release (May 28, 2014, 10:00 
AM), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/energy-institute-report-finds-potential-
new-epa-carbon-regulations-will-damage-us.  
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Consumers also feel the impact of the alleged benefits of preserving the 
environment through emissions regulations. According to the Energy 
Institute, as a result of increased regulation of air emissions, consumers “pay 
significantly more for electricity, see slower economic growth and fewer 
jobs, and have less disposable income, while a slight reduction in carbon 
emissions will be overwhelmed by global increases.”91 
 
There is no doubt that saving the environment is a noble goal, but it is 
not as simple as changing out your car for a bike on your daily commute. To 
achieve the government’s environmental goals, the brunt of the burden is on 
the energy industry, which operates with very costly and immutable assets. In 
2011, when the EPA proposed its first national standard for mercury 
emissions from coal-burning power plants, it not only noted that the proposed 
regulations may force a number of older plants to shut down, but also that the 
estimated total annual cost of compliance would be about $10 billion.92 
Households would also bear some of those costs and could see their electric 
bills rise by $3 to $4 per month, once the regulations are in full force after 
2015.93  
 
For example, Kansas City Power & Light recently filed a request with 
the Missouri Public Service Commission to increase electric service rates by 
15.8 percent (about $13 per month), to about 270,000 of its 564,000 Missouri 
residential customers.94 One primary reason for the proposed increase is the 
company’s need to recover costs for federal and state-mandated 
environmental upgrades95 at one of the utility’s coal-fired power plants.96  
                                                
91 Id.  
92 John M. Broder and John Collins Rudolph, Mercury Emission Limits for Coal Plants 
Proposed by E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011.  
93 Id. 
94 KCP&L requests rate increase to cover upgrade costs at coal-fired power plant. 
POWER ENGINEERING. (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2014/11/kcp-l-
requests-rate-increase-to-cover-upgrade-costs-at-coal-fired-power-plant.html.  
95 The environmental improvements include the installation of baghouses and wet 
scrubbers, a new chimney to serve both units, and a selective catalytic reduction system, 
all of which will reduce emissions at the power plant. Id. 
96 Id. (Other reasons for the rate increase include “the numerous infrastructure and system 
improvements KCP&L has made to maintain the overall reliability of its electrical system 
and modernize the grid.”). Id.  
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1 
 
69 
Initially, when Congress passed the CAA, it recognized the uphill 
battle of environmental rehabilitation. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in 
U.S. v. Cinergy Group, Congress gave the EPA the authority to grandfather 
in certain provisions for existing power plants with the reasoning that once 
those power plants were retired, new power plants would be built and 
maintained subject to current rigorous pollution controls.97 Today, most of 
these grandfathered old power plants are out of commission. However, 
expensive problems arise when a company chooses to modify a power plant 
instead of building a new one, in an attempt to save on the cost of complying 
with increasingly rigorous environmental regulations.  
 
As the court observed in U.S. v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 
because the purpose of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) 
program is to preserve air quality in already clean areas, PSD requirements 
are forward-looking in terms of what utilities must do before commencing 
construction.98 Although some courts have interpreted this to mean that the 
PSD program requirements applied only to newly constructed power plants, 
the Sixth Circuit noted that by adding a “modification rule”99 into the 
grandfathered provisions of the CAA, Congress intended to “ensure that 
pollution control measures are taken when they can be most effective, at the 
time of new or modified construction.”100 U.S. v. Ohio Edison Co. solidified 
the bright-line rule that anything above de minimis routine maintenance 
triggers the modification rule, and hence, compliance with the most current 
CAA regulations.101 
 
                                                
97 United States v. Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2006). 
98 United States v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 823 F.Supp.2d 274, 281 (W.D. Pa. 
2011). 
99 The Clean Air Act provides that “routine maintenance, repair or replacement activities 
are exempt from the general rule that a modification project triggers CAA compliance. 
The term “modification” is defined as “any physical change in, or change in the method 
of operation, of a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant 
emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not 
previously emitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2012).  
100 National-Southwire Aluminum Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 838 F.2d 835, 843 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(Boggs, J. dissenting). 
101 United States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1024 (S.D. Ind. 2003). 
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Courts have often repeated that, in the beginning, the sustainability of 
CAA was dependent on grandfathering in certain older power plants. 
However, until all pre-CAC power plants are decommissioned, voluntarily, 
and not due to the sky-rocketing costs of maintaining a plant under stringent 
CAA regulations, the EPA should have generous grandfathering flexibility to 
work with companies to meet the government’s ambitious environmental 
goals. Fortunately, this fact was recognized by the EPA in recent written 
comments submitted to the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, where the agency’s administrator Gina McCarthy wrote, “In the 
event that the EPA does undertake action to address [greenhouse gas] 
emissions from existing power plants, the agency would ensure, as it always 
seeks to do, ample opportunity for States, the public and stakeholders to offer 
meaningful input on potential approaches.”102  
 
Although the Ninth Circuit came to the correct legal conclusion in 
this case, the court should have brought the Chevron test103 into a more 
compromising and cost-efficient position in the context of the CAA. The 
court would have been better off upholding the EPA’s use of grandfathering 
authority in this case, even if the agency’s actions were not codified in the 
act’s formal procedural requirements. The precedential value of such a ruling 
would have made a powerful impact by signifying that implementation of the 
CAA, including grandfathering authority, would be left exclusively to the 
EPA. Even in Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized the legislative struggle 
to balance the government’s interest of reducing pollution rapidly with social 
costs and economic concerns of industrial development.104 Therefore, when 
considering Congressional intent behind the CAA, courts should place equal 
value on pro-environment and pro-business interests, making it a balancing 
test in every respect.  
 
It is true that ever since the implementation of the CAA, Congress has 
intended that every emission-emitting facility must meet the “lowest 
achievable emission rate” under the current standards for that type of 
                                                
102 Daniel Cusick, U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants: Update or Close? SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (May 20, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/us-coal-fired-
power-plants-update-close/.  
103 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
104 Id. at 848. 
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facility.105 However, the achievement of this objective must not come at the 
expense of rising costs for businesses and consumers through expensive asset 
modifications, escalating electric bills, and litigation over any exception that 
does not follow the formal procedures of implementing environmental 
controls.  
 
 In this case, Avenal Power should have been required to bring its 
power plant up to the most recent environmental standards. In fact, for nearly 
six years, Avenal Power worked with the EPA to meet continually changing 
emissions touchstones until the agency chose to make an exception and 
rectify its own violation of a statutory one-year deadline for granting permits.  
The EPA was not allowing Avenal Power to get away with violating the 
CAA regulations, however. Instead, the agency was properly using its 
statutory grandfathering authority to work one-on-one with a company in a 
situation that was partially created by the EPA’s inattention. In effect, by 
sending the “EPA and Avenal Power back to the drawing board,”106 the 
Ninth Circuit, in a roundabout way, instructed the EPA to work one-on-one 
with Avenal Power to make sure the company found a way to meet the most 
updated emissions standards.  
Per the Ninth Circuit's holding, this case comes full circle to two 
contradicting considerations: pro-business versus pro-environment. In the 
aftermath of this decision, depending on how far off Avenal Power is from 
full compliance, the EPA will either end up grandfathering in provisions for 
Avenal Power anyway, or the company will be forced to make costly 
modifications at the expense of its customers’ electric bills in order to pacify 
Congress’s lofty intentions of saving the environment. Either way, the 
decision is once again left up to the EPA, the agency tasked with balancing 
pro-business and pro-environmental concerns while trying to meet 
impractical goals. Although this is no easy feat, the EPA’s history proves that 
the agency is capable of implementing and enforcing the environmental 
standards and goals tasked to it by Congress’ necessary implication. 
Consequently, courts should respect the authority granted to the EPA by 
allowing it to use grandfathering as a flexible tool of operation.  
                                                
105 41 Fed. Reg. 55524 (Dec. 21, 1976). 
106 Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 762 F.3d 971, 984 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 





The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A. overlooked 
an opportunity to give greater flexibility to the EPA to enforce environmental 
standards in the construction of a new power plant. Giving only slight 
deference to the pro-business arguments, the court narrowly interpreted the 
EPA’s grandfathering authority under the CAA. Although the court sent the 
parties back to the drawing board, with its legal analysis so heavily focused 
on promoting environmental goals, the court significantly restricted the 
EPA’s ability to work with Avenal Power to achieve the desired results. This 
standard will almost certainly limit the EPA’s authority to deal with other 
regulatory issues that will arise the next time a power plant is unable to meet 
a new environmental regulation on time. As a result, the tension between 
satisfying pro-business and pro-environment supporters will continue to put 
pressure on the EPA and its efforts to protect the nation’s air resources.  
 
 
